Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2003

Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After September 11
Michael B. Gerrard
Columbia Law School, michael.gerrard@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael B. Gerrard, Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After September 11, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP.
J. 223 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/702

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

WIDENER LAW.
SYMPOSIUM JOURNAL
Volume 9

2003

Issue 2

DISASTERS FIRST: RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
MICHAEL B. GERRARD*

I. INTRODUCTrION
Many environmental statutes were enacted, or at least spurred along, in direct
response to disasters. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
followed from the Santa Barbara Oil Spill; the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 2 resulted from the chemical gas
disaster in Bhopal, India; the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)' was sparked by the Love Canal
incident; and the Oil Pollution Acte was a reaction to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to the Homeland Security
Act and to several other enactments. The collapse of the World Trade Center
was perhaps the greatest disaster in the history of New York, and some of the
regulatory changes that flowed from these events have reflected the
environmental implications. But that horrible day should also lead to lessons that
have still greater ramifications for environmental law.
The principal lesson should be that disasters-whether accidental, intentional
or natural-can have environmental impacts that overshadow the consequences
of most gradual events. While modem environmental law is largely oriented to
* Michael B. Gerrard is a partner in the New York office of Arnold & Porter and Vice
Chair of the American Bar Association's Section of Environment, Energy and Resources. Fie has
taught environmental law as a member of the adjunct faculties of Columbia Law School and the
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and is the author or editor of five books, two
of which were named Best Law Book of the Year by the Association of American
Publishers-EntimnmtalLawPradice Guide (9 vols., Matthew Bender & Co. 1992) and Brewnfit dr
Law and Pratire:The Ckanp and Re wopssut of CoutamixatedLand (Matthew Bender & Co., 1998).
B.A., Columbia University, 1972; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1978.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (2002).
2. 42 U.S.C. 11001-11050 (2002).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (2002).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 2701-2761 (2002).
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addressing slow-acting events and effects, September 11 should teach 'us the
importance of addressing the sudden as much as the slow.
The greatest threats to the long-term health of the planet's ecology are indeed
long-acting-for example, global climate change and the degradation of the
oceans. Other persistent environmental conditions cause many deaths, such as
air pollution in industrialized areas and poor sanitation in many parts of the Third
World. However, other concerns present effects that are both localized and, in
the scheme of things, relatively minor, though enormous resources are devoted
to them. Aspects of the law of hazardous waste disposal are a prominent
example. CERCLA primarily serves to protect people who might some day live
atop contaminated sites and drink the water or be exposed to chemicals in the
soil or the air there. CERCLA has absorbed a disproportionate share of the
attention in environmental law, and about $6 billion per year is spent on meeting
its requirements,' but the health risks it addresses tend to be minor. Some
researchers have found insufficient data to determine whether hazardous waste
sites really do pose a serious threat to human health," and others have presented
figures that lead to the conclusion that less than one death per year is caused by
exposure to CERCLA sites!
In stark contrast, during the 2 0 ,h Century at least four industrial accidents took
more than 1,000 lives, and another five took more than 500 lives? In all, several

5. KATHERINE N. PROBS'T ETAL, FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: WIIC)
PAYS AND How? 11 (1995).
6. NA'nINAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY VOLUME I: PUBLIC
1-1EAIATI AND HAZARDOUS WASTES (1991); Dimitrios Trichopoulos et al., What Causes Canar?, 27 5
SCI. AM., Sept. 1996, at 80,85.
7. JAMIES T. HAMILrON & W. KIP ViSCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS: TIlE SPATIAL AND
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OP HAZARDOUS WAST1*E POLICY 15 (1999) (found that median number

of cancer cases over 30 years at CERCLA sites was 0.017 per site; if that ratio applies to all of the
approximately 1,500 National Priorities List sites nationwide, that equates to about 25 cases of
cancer. Fewer than half of all cancers are ultimately fatal, so this in turn translates to 12 deaths, ani
less than one per year.).
8. These accidents occurred in Bhopal, India in 1984 (toxic vapor); Salang Pass, Afghanistan
in 1982 (toxic vapor); Cali, Colombia in 1956 (explosion of ammunition); and Kyshtym, USSR in
1958 (radioactive leak). See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES 105-22 (1984); Bhola Ram Gurjar & Manju Mohan, Environmental Risk Anasir:
Probkms and Perpeciives in Different Comntries, 13 RISK 1,2 (2002); SUSAN L. CUTirER, LIVING WITIl
RISK: THE GEOGRAPHYOFTECHNOLOGICALHAZARDS 101-02 (1993). Some have also numbered

in the thousands the deaths resulting from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, though the actual number
is unknown. WILLIAM M. EVA:N & MARK MANION, MINDING THE MACHINrus: IiREVENTING;
TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS 16 (2002).

9. Texas City, Texas in 1947 (explosions of ammonium nitrate); Acha Ufa, USSR in 1989
(explosion of natural gas); Cubato, Brazil in 1984 (explosion of gasoline); St. Juan lxhautepec,
Mexico in 1984 (explosion of natural gas); Oppau, Germany in 1921 (chemical plant explosion).
See Gurjar & Mohan, supra note 8, at 2.
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hundred people die each year around the world in industrial accidents."' One
analysis found that in the United States between 1900 and 1990, there were a
total of 339 chemical accidents (defined as accidents where there was an
explosion or the release of a vapor or toxic cloud)." Thus by all accounts the
number of people killed in these events exceeds by several orders of magnitude
the number of people who die from the kinds of exposures addressed in
CERCLA. Indeed, one violation of one statute on the fringes of environmental
law killed more people than may have been cumulatively saved by most or all
CERCLA cleanups-the improper transport of old oxygen cannisters, in
violation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, aboard Valujet Flight
592 on May 1, 1996,
leading to a fire and then a crash in the Everglades that
2
killed 110 people.'

Some industrial accidents create widespread and long-lasting environmental
damage. Most prominent of these are the Chemobyl nuclear disaster of 1986,
which contaminated several hundred square miles in and around the Ukraine, and
the 1976 explosion of a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy, which spread dioxin over
several towns between Lake Como and Milan.' Additional examples include a
damburst of a tailing pond in Baia Mare, Romania in 2000, spilling cyanide into
the Danube and other rivers," and a damburst in Aznalcollar, Spain, in 1998,
contaminating the Dofiana National Park with highly acidic water.'" Other
incidents lead to transitory releases of poisons that kill people and then disperse,
or cause environmental damage only inside factory gates. No comprehensive
analysis seems to be available about the relative environmental damage caused by
accidents versus ongoing industrial operations, though it seems likely that
accidents are usually the smaller part of this equation. One 2002 study found that
urban runoff, municipal and industrial discharges, and discharges from small
boats and jet skis cause a much greater portion of petroleum releases to the
oceans than do large oil spills.' 6 Some chemical and oil production facilities are
known to have long, slow leaks that over a period of many years have released
large quantities of contamination into the environment. 7
10. KEnI SMmI,ENVIRONMENTAL lAZARDS: ASSE ;SING; RISK AND REDUCING DISAZ'rER

323-25 (3d ed. 2001).
11. (CUTrER, supra note 8, at 103, 105.
12. JAMES R. CHILES, INVMNG DISASTER:

LESSONS FROM THE EDGE OFP "'TECIINOIX);Y

150-55 (2001).
13. THE LONG ROADTO RECOVERY: COMMUNITY RESPONSESTO INDUSTRIAL DISAS'TER 86-

90,215-19 (James K. Mitchell ed., 1996).
14. Aaron Schwabach,FrmSchWf halktoBaiaMar:The ConinuinsFailurvoflnterationalLaw
to Protect Europe's Riers, 19 VA. ENvTL L.J. 431,432-33 (2000).
DisaterThrratensSpainh DonanaNational
15. Jerrold Long, HaZardousMateriahandEne:MAine
Park, 1998 COLO. J. INT'L ENVIL. L & POL'Y Y.B. 310 (1999).
16. National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea Ill: Inputs, Fates, and Effects (2002).
17. SeeTHOMAS D. BEAMISH,SILENTSPILLiTHE ORGANIZATION OFAN INDUSTRIALCRISIS
(2002) (account of 38-year-long spill of up to 20 million gallons of oil and chemicals from Unocal
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Environmental law is about both protecting the public health and preserving
the natural environment. Industrial accidents and other disasters are major
threats to the public health and deserve much more attention than they now
receive in the scheme of environmental regulation.",
H. THE DI(HoToMY BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAI.
RISK

The collapse of the World Trade Center killed 343 New York City firefighters,
23 police officers, and 75 other emergency response personnel." A year later
several hundred of the survivors were still suffering from respiratory and other
effects of the collapse and the subsequent rescue operation." These rescue
workers have deservedly been seen as heroes for voluntarily exposing themselves
to grave risks to save others.
Thus it is a great irony that, in several ways, the regulatory system generally
gives much less regard to occupational risks-such as those experienced by the
New York City rescuers--than to environmental risks. The budget of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is several times that of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).2' [cite latest budget]
When the two agencies regulate exposure to the same chemicals, OSHA's
standards often allow exposure to many times the levels permitted by EPA.'
OSHA seeks to prevent risks greater than one excess worker death for every
1000 workers, while EPA aims at risks of one in one million.' Only OSHA can
Corporation's oil field in Guadalupe Dunes, California); Elizabeth Kolbert, Mobilto Pay Miions to
Ckais Up Vat Poolof Oil liwath Brookj, N.Y. TI MEs, July 10, 1990, at A1.
18. Such natural disasters as hurricanes, volcanoes and floods can cause immense
environmental damage and kill many people, but they are beyond the scope of this article.
19. See FadsAboet Sept. 11: Death Toll,availabk at http://www.poughkeepsiejoumal.com/
projects/9-1 I _anniverary/Stories/hIo91 102s28.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
20. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Injwies andIllnessesAmong Now York Ciy Fire
Department Ressee Workmrr After Re*oadixg to the World Trade Center Attacks, 51 MO)RBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKIY. REP., Sept. 11, 2002, at 1; Heidi Evans, WTC suty: /Workers
sillgaspingforair;
Hafeofsaned orkrn ssffrailowetr, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Dec. 15, 2002, at 8.
21. SeeEPA Newsroom, aiailabkathttp://epa.gov/epahome/headline_020402.htm;OSl\
Trade News Release, available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/osha.../
owadisp.show-document?p.table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id= 1182&ptext__version= FALS.
22. Lynn K. Rhinehart, W'osld Wlorerr Be Better ProteedIf Thy Were Declaredan Endangtered
Seaes? A Comparison of Chmitial Enercement Under the Federal Vorkplace Safe*y and Entironmental
ProuctionLawrs, 31 AM. CRiM. L REV. 351, 354 n.16 (Winter 1994). Similarly, see Kristin ShraderFrechette, Workp me Pollutei:NmdcarSait, Ethics, and the
Exploitation-AvoidanceAlmgent, 12 IIsK
311,316-17 (2001) (maximum permissible radiation dose for industrial workers much greater than
for public).
23. Rhinehart, stpra note 22, at 354 n.16. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (2002). Risk
prevention goals are often expressed in terms of lifetime cancer risk; even where the goal is the same
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enforce most OSHA standards, while most of the federal environmental statutes
allow citizens to sue.2' 'Far more criminal convictions have been obtained for
violations of EPA regulations than of OSHA regulations, the penalties are greater
and the prosecutors' burden of proof is much lower.2 The liability scheme of
CERCLA is so severe that it has become customary to audit a manufacturing
facility's environmental conditions before the facility is sold or financed; audits
of occupational conditions are much less common.
The principal rationale for these discrepancies in legal treatment is that
occupational exposure is voluntary.2 ' Some scholars have argued that workers
27
receive "compensating wage differentials" for the risks they endure on the job,
while others question the existence of these wage differentials and also state that
the decisions to take occupational risks are only partially voluntary,2" with
nonunionized workers in dangerous jobs actually being. paid less than their
counterparts in less dangerous jobs.2Whatever the reasons for these discrepancies, their existence has had perverse
results. One arises in the context of CERCLA cleanups. The most thorough of
these cleanups tend to involve excavating large quantities of contaminated
materials and hauling them to distant landfills or incinerators for disposal. Such
excavation poses real risks to the workers involved (mostly from the heavy
equipment rather than from the chemicals); and trucking the material also poses
dangers to the drivers and to other motorists. The risks of injury and death from
this work often exceed-and sometimes by orders of magnitude-the risks that
the cleanups are designed to prevent:"
for environmental and occupational risk, the loss of average life expectancy is much greater for

occupational risks because they afflict younger populations on average than do environmental risks.
W.F. Ten Berge & P.J.M. Stallen, How to Compar the Risk Assessments for Addental and Chronic
Exposur, 15 RISK ANALYSIS, 1995, at 111, 113.

24. See Ariela Migdal, RCRA in the Workpae. Uing EnvironmentalL.aw to Combat Dangerous
Conditions in Sweatshops, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1843, 1853-54 (Dec. 2000).
25. Rhinehart, um note 22, at 353.
26. Shrader-Frechette, supra note 22, at 317.
27. See, e.g., W. KIp Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBII.ITIEs
izoIt RISK 6-8, 66-69 (1992).
28. See, e.g., PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND MORALITY: ECONOMICS, DANGEROUS WORK,
AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 137-141 (1996).
29. Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wge Compensation for Danugeros Work Revted, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 116,133 (Oct. 1998).

30. Michael B. Gerrard, Safet0yHardtinHaZardousWaste Remediai'on,N.Y. L.J.,July 26,2002
at 3; John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Shod ChaningSbort-Term Risk:-A Stdy of Saperfund
Remed Se"ection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 270 (Summer 1998). Along similar lines, certain

technologies to remove arsenic from drinking water require the transport of so much filtration
material that more lives may be lost from the transport than would be saved from the treatment.
Floyd J. Frost et al., Phsicalljut RisksAssodatedwith Dtinking WlaterArsenic Tratment, 22 RISK 235
(2002).
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Another example is the abatement of asbestos from homes, schools and

businesses. There is no question that large numbers of people who worked with
asbestos in building ships and erecting buildings, or who mined asbestos, have
suffered serious or fatal illnesses as a result. But the evidence is much less clear
that it is hazardous to occupy a building that contains intact (as opposed to
friable) asbestos. Asbestos is not like a radioactive material that continually emits

harmful rays, but it does emit what we might imagine as liability rays: its presence,
even if passive and unseen, can make it difficult to sell or finance a building.

Thus an industry has emerged to remove asbestos from buildings. Segments of
this industry are less than scrupulous in training their workers and requiring them
to wear the required protective gear, and some employers have been known to
use undocumented aliens whose lack of English and whose fear of deportation
have made them especially vulnerable. Thus the abatement of asbestos creates
occupational hazards that may well exceed the health benefits of the cleanup."1
There are many other instances where occupational safety and health is
potentially at odds with environmental protection. " A few examples:
" Surface mining of coal has much greater environmental impacts than deep
mining, but deep mining is far more dangerous for the workers.
* The widening and straightening of roadways may destroy wetlands and
wildlife habitat, but may reduce traffic fatalities.

I Similarly, longer airport runways may harm natural areas but improve air
safety.
R Cell telephone towers are unsightly but aid emergency response to
accidents.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has released comparative figures on the fatality
rates for those in certain high-risk occupations. Deaths per 100,000 employed
are 14.0 for police and detectives; 15.0 for material moving equipment operators;
18.3 for firefighters; 27.9 for truck drivers; and 41.1 for construction laborers. "
Thus the dangers to those engaged in the kinds of work involved in hazardous
waste cleanup are of the same order as, or even greater than, those faced by
firefighters and police officers. One of the lessons of September 11 is that the
full measure of respect and protection should be given to those who put their
lives on the line to save others from harm; and this measure should be provided
to members of all the affected occupations, and not only those in uniform.

31. See P. Mark Glencross & David C. Christiani, Health HaZard ofAbatement Work.Asbestos
and L.Dad, 6 NEw SOLUTIONS, Spring 1996, at 23; Heather MacDonald, Asbestos and TB: A Ta of
Two Cises,CITYJ., Winter 1994, at 50.
32. See ,general RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND TIE
ENVIRONMENT ohn D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
33. Cindy Clarke & Mark J. Zak, Fataitiesto Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters, 1992-97,
COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Summer 1999, at 3, 7.
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III. SUDDEN INCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

As the towers collapsed-and thousands of people were crushed to death in
a few horrifying instants, and lower Manhattan was engulfed in a toxic cloud of
pulverized asbestos, lead, and plastics-the environmental laws designed to
protect against a one-in-a-million chance of cancer over a 70-year lifetime seemed
entirely irrelevant. Now from the perspective of more than a year after the event,
but with no assurance that there will not be more days like September 11, it still
seems that the laws concerned with disasters are of particular relevance. Thus it
is ironic that one of the legal aftermaths of September 11 has been to weaken
rather than strengthen several of these laws.
The reason is that these laws operated chiefly by making information available
about potential accidents and their consequences, and now-with greater
appreciation for the sophistication as well as the destructiveness of our
enemies-it is apparent that this information could fall into the wrong hands,
and make some of these worst-case scenarios horribly come true. A group that
can learn to fly jetliners can also surf the web. Principal among the laws that
make hazard information publicly available are the post-Bhopal enactment,
EPCRA (also known as SARA Tide III),' and Section 112(r) of the Clean Air
Act.3" Both require that facilities report to government authorities if they utilize
more than specified quantities of specified hazardous chemicals, and prepare
emergency response plans. Even before September 11, Congress had taken steps
to restrict the public release of information prepared under these laws. ' Since
then, additional restrictions had been imposed.37
The U.S. hazardous waste laws (unlike the air and water pollution control laws)
contain few requirements for reducing waste production, but these disclosure
laws were found to operate as powerful incentives for pollution prevention - and
precisely because the information was made public.3" Companies did not relish
appearing on the "ten worst polluters" lists that the newspapers invariably
printed after the annual reports were issued, and thus they took real steps to
reduce their use of the covered chemicals. Today's challenge is find a way to
34. 42 U.S.C. % 11001 -11050 (2002).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2002); 40 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2002).
36. Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act of 1999, 42
U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(H)(ii); 65 Fed.Reg. 24,837 (Apr. 27,2000) (concerning public release of off-site

consequence analyses prepared under Clean Air Act).
37. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, requires the preparation of vulnerability assessments for drinking water
facilities and prohibits the release of these assessments to the public. See also ASS'N OF.
METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES, STATE FOIA LAWS: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING SENSITIVE

WATER SECURITY INFORMATION Ouly 2002), available at http://www.amwa.net/isac/
StateFOlA.pdf.
38. Susan L. Santos et al., Industy Reponse to SARA Title III:PollutionPrevention,Risk Reduction,
and Risk Communication, 16 RISK 57 (1996).
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release enough information to preserve the salutary effects of these laws, without
releasing so much that the terrorists' task of finding targets is made easier.
Another challenge is to make sure that environmental laws, especially their
stringent command-and-control mandates, do not interfere with the response to
emergencies when they occur. Provisions allowing the suspension of certain
requirements in cases of emergency are found in the Clean Air Act,"9 the Clean
Water Act, " CERCLA,4 the Endangered Species Act,4 2 the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 3 the Ocean Dumping Act,44 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, " the Safe Drinking Water Act,46 the Wilderness
Act," and the Toxic Substances Control Act."8 All these emergency provisions
are different; they were enacted at different times and display no uniformity. In
contrast, almost identical "act of God" and "act of war" exemptions from liability
appear in the Clean Water Act, 49 CERCLA,5 " and the Oil Pollution Act. 5' The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a procedural law that cuts across
all of the substantive laws, also provides for an emergency exemption for the
requirement for an environmental impact statement.5 2 The Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (a primary authorizing statute for
the Federal Emergency Management Agency) includes a NEPA exemption for
many emergency response actions."3 In a few instances Congress has declared
emergencies and specifically exempted actions in response from environmental
statutes.4
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(0 (2002); 40 C.F.R. § 51.853(d)(2), (e) (2002).
40. 33 C.F.R. § 337.7 (2002).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c), 9607(d) (2002); 40 C.F.R. 300.440 (2002).

42. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(p) (2001).
43. 40 C.F.R. § 166.2 (2002). See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp.
650 (D.D.C. 1978).
44. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 220 (2002). See Richard G. Hildreth et al., Evaluation of the
New Canssa

Incidentfor Improvements to State, Federal,and InternationalLaw, 16 J. fE'NVrJ..
L. & Lrn(;. 81, 85-92
(2001).
45. 42 U.S.C. % 6961(a), 6973 (2002).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(D) (2002).

47. 16 US.:.

1133(c) (2002).

48. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (2001).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1) (2002). See Ralph M. Sugg, Blame it on the Rain? ElNiho Is No
Excuse To Pollute, 21 WHITIER L. REV. 737, 746 (Spring 2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2002).
52. 40 C.F.R.. 1506.11(2002). See Raymond Takashi Swenson, DeseiStorm,Desert FloodA
Guide to Emeqeng and Other Exemptionsfrom NEPA and OtherEvironmentalLaws, FED. I"ACILITIES
ENVTL. J. 3, 24 (1991). See also Exec. Order 12,114 § 2-5(a)(vii) (exception for disaster and
emergency relief actions in environmental review of federal actions abroad).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 5159 (2002); 44 C.F.R. § 10.8(c), 10.8(d)(2)(xii) (2002).
54. Particularly controversial was the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program adopted in
Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 240 (1995). SeeTrilby C.L. Dorn, Lagnog Without Laws: The
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Several emergency exemptions were in fact utilized in the aftermath of the
World Trade Center collapse. NEPA's New York counterpart, the State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA),s exempts from the requirement
for the preparation of environmental impact statements:
emergency actions that are immediately necessary on a limited and temporary basis
for the protection or preservation of life, health, property or natural resources,
provided that such actions are directly related to the emergency and are performed
to cause the least change or disturbance, practicable under the circumstances, to the
environment. 5
The courts have interpreted this provision broadly to encompass events that at
first glance do not look much like emergencies (such as prison overcrowding and
homelessness), 7 but obviously the response to the WTC disaster fits squarely
within this definition.5 8 Various emergency provisions were invoked to allow
solid waste transfer stations to handle the large quantities of garbage that backed
up when much transportation in the City ground to a halt, and to accommodate
the barges that were brought in to take away some of the debris.
A state statute provides that:
[s]ubject to the state constitution, the federal constitution and federal statutes and
regulations ... the governor may by executive order temporarily suspend specific

provisions of any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or
parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with
such provisions
would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the
9
disaster:.

Governor George Pataki used this law on September 12 to suspend many
statutes of limitations, and in the ensuing weeks he used it to facilitate the
removal of debris from the site. Most of the debris went to the Fresh Kills
Landfill on Staten Island. That locally despised landfill had been scheduled to
close on December 31, 2001, by operation of a state law enacted in 1996" after
many years of controversy, but in the emergency the landfill's life was temporarily
199 Salvae Lging Rider Radicaly Changes Poly and the Rule of Law in the Forests, 9 TUi,. ENVTL. L.J.
447, 463-65 (1996); Patti A. Goldman & Kristen L. Boyles, Forsaking the Rule of Lawv. The 1995
Iogging Without Laws Rider and its Legaby, 27 ENVI'L. L. 1035, 1048 (Winter 1997); Michael Axline,

Forest Health and the Poeitics ofExpeaieny, 26 ENVTL. L. 613, 613-14 (Summer 1996).
55. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. L. %8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2002).
56. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(c)(33) (2002).
57. See Michael B. Gerrard et al., EnironmentalImpact Review in New York (1990, 2002 supp.)
2.01141[d.0
58. If it did not, some of the activities at the World Trade Center site arguably would require
an environmental impact statement. See Williamsburg Around the Bridge Block Ass'n v. Giuliani,
644 N.Y.S. 2d 252, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (EIS required for City protocol for sandblasting of
lead paint from bridges, as it could cause hazardous dust to be blown into nearby community).
59. N.Y. EXEC. LAW . 29-a (McKinney 2002).
60. N.Y. LEGIS. LAWS ch. 107 (Consol. 1996).
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extended. For months it was a crime scene, as law enforcement personnel
meticulously combed through the incoming loads for human remains and for
evidence that might shed light on the perpetrators of the attacks.
At the north end of the site destroyed by the terrorists stood Seven World Trade
Center, a 616-foot-tall office building that caught fire and (thankfully after having
been fully evacuated) collapsed on the afternoon of September 11. The bottom
of the building was occupied by a Consolidated Edison Co. electrical substation
that supplied power to most of lower Manhattan. The destruction of this
substation plunged the area into a blackout. Service was restored under a jerryrigged system of above-ground cables, but these were vulnerable to accidental
damage. In order to restore reliable electrical service to this area - a
neighborhood that includes the New York Stock Exchange and other operations
that are vital to the global economy - it was necessary to rebuild the substation
as quickly as possible. Since the substation was an integral part of the office
building, the building itself had to go back up on an expedited basis. Various
considerations of urban planning required changes in the building's design; the
old building could not simply be rebuilt as it had been. New York State and City
authorities agreed to use emergency procedures to allow the building with the
substation to be approved in much faster than the usual time."
At the federal level, certain exemptions were triggered by the FEMA's
declaration of New York City as a disaster area on September 11 ,'2 and FEMA
and other federal assistance flowed into New York without major environmental
impediments. No decisions have been made as to what will be built on the main
World Trade Center site, or what approval processes will be followed.
IV. INCORPORATING THE LESSONS OF SEPTEMBER 11 INTO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The catastrophes of September 11 should teach a number of lessons about the
laws that regulate environmental health and safety. Some of them are discussed
below.
A. Incident Scenarios - Environmental decision-making depends on forecasts
of the possible consequences of contemplated actions. NEPA, in particular,
requires consideration of the impacts of an array of alternatives, and the
implementing regulations call for analysis of "impacts which have catastrophic
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the
analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based
on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason." ' After September 11,
61. The author of this article serves as environmental counsel to the building's owner,
Silverstein Properties, and this account isdrawn from that experience.
62. The declaration appears athttp://www.fema.gov/library/dizOl/d1391.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003).
63. 40 C.F.R. S 1502.22(b)(1) (2002).
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many scenarios are plausible that previously were solely the domain of action
thrillers. It remains to be seen what kinds of scenarios federal agencies will now
analyze under NEPA, what efforts they will make to keep this analysis secret, and
what effect the exercise will have on the substantive decisions that they make.
Emergency plans under EPCRA should also reflect plausible terrorist acts.' A
catastrophic scenario can be imagined for almost any significant federal approval
of a new facility; these scenarios should not induce paralysis in the approval
process, but they should be carefully assessed.
Officials should call for some consistency in the way catastrophes are depicted.
Under current practice, it is common to imagine worst case scenarios with
respect to the presence of hazardous waste (trespassers will spend their days
rolling around in the dirt on contaminated sites, the most toxic chemicals will not
be discovered, people will drill drinking water wells directly into the underground
plumes), and best case scenarios for the cleanups (workers will always wear
respirators and the trucks will never crash). Such imbalanced scenarios will lead
to distorted decisions.
B. Protection Standards - As noted above, CERCLA aims to protect against
risks on the order of 10"', and tens or hundreds of millions of dollars have been
spent at individual sites addressing such risks. The disaster of September 11
killed on the order of 103 people. This immense gap of nine orders of magnitude
suggests that some greater degree of proportionality is necessary in deciding
where society should devote its limited resources.
C. Emergency Preparedness - Many lives were saved on September 11
because the emergency response personnel in New York City responded so
quickly and bravely. Many more lives could have been saved had the radio
systems worked better inside the burning towers."5 The analysis of worst case
scenarios performed under NEPA, EPCRA and other laws should be
accompanied by consideration of how to prepare for these scenarios should they
66
occur.
D. Public Information - Combating terrorism is requiring a balancing of
values that before September 11 each seemed absolute. Among the values that
must be balanced are giving the public the information they need to participate
in decisions and to prepare for possible futures, and not releasing information
that can assist terrorists. There is no magic formula for reaching this balance;
64. SeeBeth A. Henning, EPCRA EmergengPlans: What to ConsiderPost-September11, 16 N M'.
RESOURES & ENV'r, (ABA), Winter 2002, at 172; LEPCO and DeiberateRelases.:Addressing Terrorist
Activities in the Local Emegeng Plan, EPA FACTSIHEET (Chemical Emergency Preparedness &
Prevention Office) Aug. 2001, availabk at http://www.epa/gov/ceppo/factsheets/lepccf.pdf.
65. See Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, 9/11 Tape Raises Added_0metions on Raio Failres, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9,2002, at Al.
66. CombatingTerrorim: ConsideratiouforlnvestingRerouresinChemicalandBiolo&icalPreparedness,
Before Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffair, GAO-02-162T (2001) (Statement of Henry L1 HiltonJr.,
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management).
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finding the right point is likely to be an ongoing tension in environmental
regulation for years to come. 7 Since September 11, much information about
critical facilities and the chemicals they use has been removed from web sites and
public reading rooms, though much of this information is still available from
non-governmental sources."
E. Regulatory Gaps - Seven federal statutes govern the handling of chemicals,
and each utilizes its own list of regulated chemicals. These lists have many
overlaps and, more disturbingly, many gaps. The lists are only occasionally
updated and do not necessarily reflect up-to-date knowledge about what
chemicals cause what kinds of harm, and what chemicals are actively used in
commerce.6 9 In October 2002 the federal Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board released the results of a review of 167 industrial accidents
since 1980 in which chemical reactions caused deaths, injuries or serious damage,
and found that more than half involved substances that are not regulated. 70 For
most chemicals in commerce, there is little or no information about their health
and safety risks, making it impossible to be sure that precautions are being
exercised wherever needed. 1
Another important regulatory gap became apparent in the weeks after
September 11. The windows in many apartments in lower Manhattan were open
or blown out when the towers fell, and the apartments were covered with residue
from the towers. EPA's jurisdiction ordinarily ends at the window, and thus this
indoor pollution fell within a regulatory hole, which was further deepened by the
absence of standards over what levels of indoor pollution are unsafe. Many
apartments were evacuated for months because there was no effective program
to clean them and declare them safe (though EPA eventually agreed, months
after the event, to clean large numbers of these dwellings).
F. Physical security - Since the birth of the modern environmental movement
in 1970 and the first OPEC oil embargo f 1973, various debates have raged over
hard paths versus soft paths to environmental protection and energy security.
The hard paths include such items as the development of new oil and gas fields,
construction of large public works projects to move and treat water, and devising
end-of-tailpipe emission controls. The soft paths include energy conservation,
alternative energy sources such as solar and wind, and various pollution
minimization, waste prevention and recycling techniques. The lines between the
67. See Stephen Gidiere & Jason Forrester, Balandng Homeland Security and Freedom of
Information, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV T, (ABA), Winter 2002, at 139.
68. Ann Davis, New Alarms Heat Up Debate On Pubfieidng ChemicalRisks, WALL ST.J., May 30,
2002, at Al.
69. John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Rtglation of Toxic and HaZardous Pollutants, 211 IARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1997).
70. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Hazard Investigation: Improving
Reactive HaZard Management 5 (Oct. 2002).
71. David Roe & William S. Pease, Toxic Ignorance, ENVTL. F., May/June 1998, at 24.
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two paths were always blurry but many people and groups showed a clear
tendency to favor items on one side of the ledger or the other.
This same debate is now being played out in the shaping of environmental and
energy policy after September 11. All agree that the terrorist attacks highlighted
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. 2 This vulnerability had been
understood for some time, and in 1996 President Clinton established the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection," but it now takes
on far greater urgency. The hard path includes hardening of the targets through
physical barriers and supporting security and intelligence mechanisms, with a high
premium on secrecy. The soft path would reduce vulnerability by limiting the use
of hazardous chemicals, and decentralizing facilities so that less material will have
to be hauled across the country. One focus of this debate was the Chemical
Security Act introduced in 2002 by Senator Jon Corzine of New Jersey.74 This
bill would not only have mandated the preparation of detailed vulnerability
assessments, but it also would have required certain chemical manufacturing
facilities to increase their "inherent safety" by finding ways to reduce their use of
hazardous chemicals and processes. The American Chemistry Council and other
trade associations opposed the latter aspect of the bill, and devised their own
voluntary codes and manuals to advance the cause of safety and security in
chemical plants.73 The bill was reported favorably out of committee in the Senate
but was not included in the legislation that was enacted in November 2002
creating the new Department of Homeland Security. 7' How Congress and the
new Department deal with these issues in 2003 will help show which path the
country is choosing.
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